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Many Americans have been caught in war zones since Pearl Harbor. Few, so far as I know, have had any experience in being allowed to go on with their own work even though they were enemy aliens. For I recently returned on the “Gripsholm” from two and a half years in Shanghai, where, before I was put in a Japanese internment camp, I spent fourteen months helping to house and feed thousands of Central European refugees.

It was in May 1941 that I went to Shanghai, sent by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) to see what could be done for 20,000 anti-Nazi refugees there, some 8,000 of them destitute and on relief. My equipment—if anything can be called “equipment” for such a task—was my professional training, and my experience in welfare agencies here and among German refugees stranded in Cuba.

In Shanghai, I found the refugees concentrated in Hongkew, a part of the International Settlement, which since 1937 has been under Japanese jurisdiction. The area was badly bombed by the Japanese invaders, and when I arrived a large section was still a mass of ruins.

The five camps sheltering approximately 2,500 men, women, and children are in the very heart of the refugee area. Based on a feeling that the refugees were only in Shanghai temporarily, no effort had ever been made to improve the housing conditions.

The camps were improvised from buildings that survived the bombardment, two schools, a barracks once used by White Russian troops, a warehouse, and the ruins of five bombed houses rebuilt on the plan of a Chinese compound to accommodate about 1,000 people. This compound was the only housing which even attempted to give some sense of family privacy. The dormitories in the other camps were terribly overcrowded, with double decker beds, and men, women, and children all thrown together. The sanitary conditions were deplorable. In the old barracks, for example, there were two antiquated toilets for 400 people. It was a shock to me to see these people living in such poverty and squalor.

The Open Door of Shanghai

SHANGHAI HAD BEEN A GENEROUS HAVEN for years. Long before Pearl Harbor, even before the invasion of Poland, the city gave refuge to thousands of Central Europeans fleeing from Hitler’s persecution. They found there the refugees of twenty years earlier, 50,000 White Russians, some 10,000 of them Jews, who came from Tsarist Rus-
sia after the Bolshevik Revolution. They found, too, a few hundred Sephardic (Spanish-Portuguese) Jews, who had lived in Shanghai for several generations.

The Sephardic Jews of Shanghai are for the most part British subjects, educated in England. Some of them are wealthy, a few multi-millionaires. But after Pearl Harbor, they, like the Americans, became enemy aliens in the eyes of the Japanese—their funds frozen, and their liberty precarious.

The White Russians constitute a comfortable middle class group, merchants, brokers, dealers in the import-export trade. In 1917, when these immigrants came, Shanghai still had “frontiers.” The story of the struggles and the courage of the Russian émigré is a familiar one. But the city needed building up, and the Russian migrant soon made a place for himself in a community on the boom.

What the Exiles Found

IT WAS INTO A CITY WITH THESE ESTABLISHED Jewish communities that the anti-Axis refugees streamed from 1938 through November 1941, with the great mass immigration in 1939. In 1939-40, Lloyd-Triestino ran a sort of ferry service between Italy and Shanghai, bringing in thousands of refugees a month—Germans, Austrians, a few Czechs—and virtually “dumping” them on the Bund, the long street bordering the waterfront.

Last come to war closed the door were 1,000 Poles who, with the help of the JDC, had started across Siberia in 1940, and finally reached Japan. In October and November, 1941, well before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese moved to Shanghai all anti-Axis refugees who had reached their islands. Among the Poles were about 500 rabbinical students and their teachers, including the oldest Yeshiva (Hebrew theological seminary) in the world. They had come all the way from Poland as a school, and reached Shanghai with not a single student, teacher, or book lost, not a lesson missed. They set up their school immediately, and went quietly on with their work.

When war was declared, there were in all more than 21,000 Jewish refugees in Shanghai. Some had been there only a few weeks, some several years. All had come not to a busy, growing Shanghai, but to a city occupied by a foreign enemy, parts of it in ruins, with foreign trade on the decline and foreign capital pulling out. The refugees were free from religious and political persecution, but the struggle to earn a living which confronted them is probably unparalleled anywhere in the world.

When the influx of refugees first began, a group of local Jews (Dutch, British, and long-resident Germans) organized a committee to help them. But the problem grew so rapidly that housing facilities arranged in the International Settlement one week, found another thousand stranded newcomers on the Bund the next, asking for shelter. Shanghai has no organized social agencies in the Western sense. Institute Chinese beg on the streets and in the winter quietly freeze to death. The White Russian and Portuguese communities have small relief organizations to help their own indigent.

There were no other Europeans in need prior to the coming of the refugees.

In desperation the local committee took off Hongkew buildings which had been shelled in 1937, made some hasty repairs and established “temporary” shelters. The only real solution for the problem, as both the committee and the refugees themselves saw, was to sift this group out of Shanghai into other countries.

Like the housing, the feeding was on a temporary, makeshift basis. The kitchen room, which 9,000 persons were receiving one scanty meal daily in the spring of 1941 was a primitive Chinese affair employing 100 refugees to operate it, costing 60 cents in Chinese money (three cents American) per meal per person, of which five sixths was for coal, only one sixth for the food itself. Often in Shanghai’s torrential rains, the kitchen floor was knee-deep in icy water. With incredible toil and effort, the unwieldy staff managed to prepare the daily dish of vegetables and a little meat, and to serve it to the refugees who lined up, each with his own bowl, to receive his two ladles (about a pint) of hot stew.

Little Vienna in China

IT MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THE refugees themselves had made every possible effort to reorganize their own lives in Shanghai on a self-supporting basis. Twelve thousand of them had succeeded in doing so, though for many it was an uncertain, hand-to-mouth livelihood. Some had left Europe early enough to bring some of their possessions with them. These sold what they had—trinkets, jewelry, pictures, clothing, and so on, to eke out a living in exile. They had reconstructed entire streets in shantied Hongkew, using the very rubble for building material. They had started small businesses of many kinds. Those who had been skilled workers in European cities—leather and metal workers, designers, knitters, tailors, milliners, bakers, confectioners, and so on—set themselves up in little shops or
peddled their goods from door to door. They started delicatessen stores and opened sidewalk cafes. Chusan Road, once a typical Chinese lane, in 1941 looked like a little street in Vienna. It was interesting to see how the things that the skilled refugees made, the services they offered, were absorbed more and more into the life of the country, notably the open air cafes, the de- licious Viennese sausages, coffees and pastries, the quilts, knitted goods, and gadgets.

The majority of the 8,000 refugees on re- lief were those who would have been handi- capped in the economic struggle even under circumstances more favorable than those of exhausted Shanghai. The destitute were in the main those over forty, without skills, many of them broken in health, some of them with personalities scarred by hardship and hopelessness. There were professional people among them, notably lawyers and some engineers, for whose training there was absolutely no outlet in Shanghai. It never had been possible to provide adequate relief, and without exception they all suffered from malnutrition, some from semi- starvation. Yet many did their best to help themselves, peddling their poor belongings and trying to pick up odd jobs.

The local committee also was operating two hospitals and a small maternity ward. The lack of sanitation and supplies, and of esprit de corps among the doctors and nurses, themselves undernourished and hun- gry, many supplementing their meager wages with other jobs, made these hospitals little more than places to sleep away from the overcrowded camps.

The whole situation was the result of an influx of people for whom no plan had been made; the belief that Shanghai was only a “way station” for them; the large proportion of destitute refugees in need of housing, food, clothes and medical care; the handling of the relief problem by kindly disposed but inexperienced volunteers; last but not least, the waning economy of Shanghai itself.

The JDC Steps In

The American Jewish Joint Distribu- tion Committee, which had been sending funds to the local committee since 1939, hoped to bring some order out of this chaos, and to help re-emigrate all those who could be rehabilitated. For this reason I was sent to Shanghai, and in November 1941, Manuel Siegel of the JDC overseas staff joined me there. Mr. Siegel and I had worked together in Cuba. He, too, is an American social worker, with experience both in private agencies and in public welfare. We were soon thoroughly familiar with the resources and limitations of Shanghai, and ready to undertake the reorganization of the refugee program.

We found early that the Germans and Austrians were interested only in going to the United States, while the others had friends or relatives to care for; hence, quota restrictions and the scarcity of ships, this was a very com- plicated undertaking. The JDC was, how- ever, able to send about three hundred Poles to Palestine, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Burma. But there was not time before Pearl Harbor to make even a real start in tackling the relocation of the Shang- hai refugees.

Realizing that re-emigration, at best, would be a long, slow process, we wanted to build within the Jewish community of Shanghai a strong local committee which would be able to carry on the work. It is never JDC policy to assume responsibility for a community; the agency provides technical advice and financial subsidy in relation to local resources. But the objective always is to turn responsibility over to the commu- nity as rapidly as possible.

With the Enemy’s Cooperation

On December 8, 1941, the Monday morning when we were to begin the re- organization of the refugee program, we were awakened at 4 a.m. by shell fire. Another Battle of Shanghai was on, simul- taneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor.

My first conscious thought was, “Now I’m trapped, too. I’ll be of no use to myself or to the refugees.” How I wished I had heeded the warnings of friends and left while I still had the chance. Then I relaxed, and like the Chinese, shrugged my shoulders and said, “May yu fa tse” (“There is no way”), the Chinese phrase of resignation.

We learned almost at once that the Jap- anese did not plan to intern enemy nationals, at least “for the present.” That “present” lasted for the whole of the succeeding year—1942. At the start however, we did not know whether “present” meant one day or one week—one month was about the limit we dared contemplate.

But as long as we were free, we were determined to do something for those who needed our help. The December remittance from the United States had just arrived. Would the Japanese help? Panic reigned in Hongkong. An undressed, stateless, unprotected group of humans faced starvation. The funds the local committee had on hand would last only until the end of De- cember. Representatives of the committee, predominantly Dutch and British enemy nationals, had approached the Japanese naval officer in charge of refugee affairs. They were coolly received and told that he could not help them. There was only one alternative for us—to try our own luck with the Japanese.

Fortunately, before Pearl Harbor we had established a good relationship with this Japanese officer. Captain I. received Mr. Siegel and me graciously. We told him about the situation in Hongkong, and ex- plained that although money could not be transmitted directly from the United States, since our respective countries were at war, nevertheless we had the authorization of the JDC to raise money locally on its credit to be repaid after the war. (This was in ac- cordance with an arrangement made by the JDC before Pearl Harbor for continuation of relief operations in occupied areas.) Fur- thermore, the Shanghai committee had local currency frozen in the bank which, if released, would enable us to operate at least until we could raise money on our credit; in addition the American Red Cross had promised 5,000 bags of cracked wheat if the Japanese would release them to us.

Much to our surprise, Captain I. agreed to help us with everything we requested, if . . . His condition was that Mr. Siegel and I take over the entire administration of the refugee program. For reasons unknown to us, he refused to cooperate with the existing committee. We had no right to question this decision. We believed we could count on his help if we accepted it—and did. Both the cracked wheat and the frozen funds were released to us after a time, and we were authorized to borrow money locally from neutrals.

We organized a new local committee, made up of French, Swiss, some German Jews long resident in Shanghai, and a few refugees. All the members were approved by Captain I. The committee worked tire- lessly with us in reorganizing, financing, and managing the refugee program; thank- lessly Mr. Siegel and I were inter- viewed; and this same committee, with a few changes in personnel, today is the mainstay of the Shanghai refugees.

Uncertainty and Hunger

The first half of 1942 was a time of terrible uncertainty for the refugees. For months it was almost impossible to raise money locally even as a loan. Many of those to whom we normally would have turned
Three refugee tailors try to support themselves with a tiny shop in their dormitory.

Refugees digging a sewer and drainage ditch.

Refugees preparing vegetables for a midday meal for the 8,000 then receiving relief.

The old White Russian barracks (middle building) has housed refugees since 1939. Here the JDC workers had their office.

Waiting outside the old kitchen for their daily stew. The camps now have a modern kitchen, but food is even scarcer.
were, like us, enemy nationals, their funds frozen. Neutrals who had money were so frightened they hesitated to show any interest in the refugees. On January 10, 1942, faced with the likelihood of having to close down, we categorically stopped all relief for 4,000 of the 8,000 refugees then receiving one bowl of stew a day.

We came to the hard decision with great reluctance, and only after canvassing every means of raising more money or of stretching the little we had. We kept on relief, the children, the aged, the sick, and those whose malnutrition was so serious that they were on "special diets." The others made shift, as they could, with the small provisions they had left, seeking help from less destitute friends, "managing" by one expedient or another. They could not have gone on long. Fortunately, they did not have to. This step gained time, then the most essential element in our planning.

**Money for a Month**

We knew we had to keep going even on a very limited scale. Once we closed down, we admitted our inability to handle the problem. That might have resulted in hunger riots and the intervention of the Japanese Gendarmerie (government police). After that anything might have followed.

The third week in January when we had just enough money for two more days even our curtailed operation, an energetic group of the more substantial refugees organized a "quick campaign," and amazed us by raising 30,000 Chinese dollars (about $1,500). This meant we could go on for six more days.

By the end of January we realized that we could not operate indefinitely on our day-by-day basis. We already had an indebtedness, inherited from the first local committee, of over 100,000 Chinese dollars. We seemed unable to arrange a loan. The refugees had done their utmost. It was essential to bring home the seriousness of the situation to the Shanghai public at large.

The only method had to be the local press. We had avoided reporters, knowing that publicity might be dangerous. But when, on January 25, 1942, a newspaper came to us to find out what was happening in Hongkew we decided to "break" the news to the papers.

The next morning headlines appeared, to the annoyance of the Japanese authorities. Mr. Siegel and I learned later that an order had been issued for our arrest which was rescinded through the efforts of a Japanese who felt kindly disposed towards us personally. But the story was also picked up by the local radio; the publicity brought the desired reaction. First individual contributions began to come in, then people offered us loans.

Soon we had money in sight to meet one month's budget and felt comparatively secure. How different this was from anything we learned in our social work training about "agency planning!" Perhaps what was fundamentally different was the reality—there was no real agency, no real community, absolutely no real basis for long range planning. We knew only that each day passed was a day gained in the race against time.

Along with the uncertainty about our funds and program, the wartime situation in Shanghai meant a lot of personal uncertainties. Neither Mr. Siegel nor I dared forget for a moment our status as enemy aliens, the probability of eventual internment and, of course, the possibility of actual physical danger. Living conditions were difficult. At first, we were comfortable enough in a Shanghai hotel. After Pearl Harbor, our personal funds, like the JDC funds for relief, no longer came through. For a few weeks, the hotel lets us pay our bills with "chits" (promissory notes), but by the first of January we were notified, courteously but firmly, that we must move.

The best accommodations we could find were two unheated rooms in the home of a White Russian family, far from Hongkew that it meant four hours of travel a day, by tram, rickshaw, bus, and on foot to reach the refugee community. Later, we were able to get rooms in another White Russian home, still without heat and very sketchily furnished. This cost us $1,500.

Though all our uncertainties and vicissitudes, we somehow managed not only to "keep going," but actually to make some gains. Two that stand out, as I look back, are the metamorphosis of our kitchen, and the achievement of a working democracy in the camps.

**The New Kitchen**

I have described the original kitchen which was so inefficient that most of the money had to be used for coal. We were lucky enough to attract the interest of a Polish engineer, who had spent many years in China and knew the resources of Shanghai. He drew up plans for a simple, efficient steam kitchen in which a staff of ten to fifteen persons could serve two meals at one time, at a cost of less than two cents a meal for fuel. The cost of this kitchen was $100,000 Chinese ($5,000 American), minus the essential steam boilers—and steam boilers could not be bought in Shanghai at that time at any price. However, we discovered that a British realty company had four steam boilers, unused for years and stored in a vacant lot. The company was at that time under Japanese supervision.

We presented our plans to the British employee in charge, but he refused to loan us the boilers, holding that if they were so much as mentioned they might be confiscated by the Japanese. This was to overlook the fact that the four huge boilers were lying out in full view! We pointed out what those boilers meant to hungry thousands. Further, we argued, our use of two of them for the duration probably would save them for the realty company. Our friend was not persuaded. Finally, we were sure we were right that we just went ahead. Through the efforts of some one who had influence with the Gendarmerie we got a removal permit for two boilers. Then we calmly gave our indignant British friend a signed statement to the effect that we were borrowing those boilers for the duration.

The kitchen was built, and dedicated to the feeding of starving refugees at a time when we had only enough money to operate from month to month. Many friends tried to discourage us from this project. What was the use of building a kitchen, they argued, when we might not be able to operate it? But that way, perhaps our scheme did seem unreasonable, but somehow we believed that funds would be forthcoming so long as anyone in Shanghai had any resources at all. There was, of course, the possibility that we might have to turn over our operations to the Japanese; but even should that day come, we reasoned, the refugees would be better fed from a modern, economical kitchen than from the old makeshift. So today, there is a sanitary steam kitchen in the heart of the refugee area. Even though only 5,000 are receiving one meal a day as I write, this is due to limitation of funds and inflation and not to lack of equipment. And in Shanghai, it will always be easier to get money than to get modern efficiency.

**Lessons in Self-Government**

And now for our experiment in democracy in the midst of the Axis. I suppose Americans can never be convinced that the democratic way is not the best way to work with human beings. When we took over the refugee program Mr. Siegel and I found ourselves embarrassingly overstaffed. The committee had 500 employees, running the five refugee camps and working in the kitchen, the hospitals, and in the administrative office which handled all applications for relief, hospitalization, and housing. Most of these employees were, in fact, on a form of work-relief. All were grossly underpaid, even by Shanghai standards. And yet the staff had clung to their jobs because the steady, if meager, wages were "better than nothing."

With the outbreak of the war, these 500 employees were in as precarious a situation as the direct recipients of relief. Late in January 1942 we called a meeting of the staff. We showed by plain arithmetic that it was impossible both to give relief and pay salaries. Further, we set forth what they all knew, that the program was overstuffed. Even if we succeeded in getting funds, efficiency required that the operating force be drastically cut. We promised that we would do everything we could to keep the program going, but we needed the help of the refugees. Since the staff was a section of the refugee population, they must decide whether or not they wanted to work along with us. We could hold out no promise either of pay now or future jobs—it was a case of "taking their chances as we were taking ours."

To maintain close contact between staff and refugees, we suggested that they select five of their number as a liaison group, representing the staff and staff interests. We closed this meeting with the suggestion that everyone present owed it to himself to look for another job and that

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JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

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Delinquency is probably the most pressing of our wartime community problems, reflected in the mounting concern of teachers, clergymen, public officials, social workers, the police and above all the mothers and fathers of the country. Here and there an attack has been made on the problem by interested persons and agencies but in general there is a good deal of uncertainty as to what can be done and how.

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Finally we found we had to close the two hospitals because of lack of funds, and we arranged with the Shanghai General Hospital to take the chronic cases. This was the chief reason why, by June 1942, the staff had been reduced from 500 to 100 persons. With a reduced personnel, we were able to work out a salary scale with the staff committee which they considered fair. Salaries were still inadequate, but they were realistic in relation to our limited resources. The problem now was how to operate the camps with fewer paid employees.

Democracy Under Axis Rule

RESIDENTS OF THE CAMPS HAD LACKED INTEREST in them, a situation due, we felt, to the completely undemocratic and dictatorial organization. We were eager to develop leadership among the refugees themselves in preparation for the day when our respite would be ended and they would have to handle their own affairs.

A meeting of the residents in each of the five camps was called and the situation explained to them. We pointed out that the camps in fact belonged to the residents, and that the maintenance, sanitation, and administration of these camps should be their responsibility. We asked that they elect their own committee to work with the one staff member we intended to keep in each camp; a camp director who was himself a refugee. In several camps the directors were not suitable persons for the post; but we suggested that the camp committees try first to work with them. Later, we promised, they would be permitted to choose new directors if that proved necessary.

It was amazing to watch those semi-starved people suddenly rouse from their lethargy. For weeks the camps buzzed with election activities. Much of the leadership came from the lawyers, who knew how to talk persuasively. Some of the engineers and former merchants were active. A trained nurse who had been an enthusiastic Social Democrat in Germany was particularly successful in organizing and leading his fellows. There were speeches, meetings, and "electioneering." In one camp election activities became so violent that the police actually had to be called in to settle a quarrel. Camp committees were elected and re-elected. The people were at first very clumsy in using the techniques of democratic organization, which do not come naturally to those of German background, but they learned, and learned fast.

We met with the representatives of each camp as frequently as our time permitted. Nothing seemed to us more important than to help these refugees develop into a self-conscious group who could direct their own fate. Often it would have been easier for us to issue orders than to try to work out compromises with the various committees: but to us that easiest way was closed by our whole tradition and experience as Americans. And it was like watching a miracle to see the people's response. In the goods activity.

Also, administrative flexibility would be necessary for success in the policies outlined. Congress would have to assign the required powers to an administrative agency—action for which there is ample precedent. The Federal Reserve Board has been given broad powers for influencing the banking and financial mechanism of the country. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and the Maritime Commission all exercise administrative powers influencing the operations of the industries concerned.

If taxation is to be used as an effective tool for keeping the savings rate in balance with consumer durable and investment activity, the agency charged with this responsibility would have to be able to adjust tax rates within certain limits in accordance with its own judgment, much as the Federal Reserve Boards adjust interest rates. To this end, Congress might set maximum rates below which tax rates would be shifted at the discretion of the agency.

The basic administrative machinery for regulating installment sales is in operation today. But substantial enlargement of these powers would be required, and general policy control would have to be delegated to the new agency created to maintain economic stabilization. Similarly, the new agency should be responsible for influencing capital activity, although administrative control might be assigned, where possible, to existing agencies such as the Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Maritime Commission.

If positive action is not taken, and if the nation is swept by a 'back to normal' movement after the war, the handwriting on the wall is clear—business will move inexorably toward a depression of colossal proportions with all the misery and desperation of large scale unemployment. If this happens again, does anyone believe that private enterprise can survive?

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we would not consider resignation a sign of disloyalty. The next day every member of the staff but one reported for work.

At the end of each month the staff committee met with Mr. Siegel and me. These were staff conferences under difficulties, with the committee crowded into our cramped little office in the old barracks. The stove always smoked. The air always was foul with odors from unsanitary and inadequate plumbing. The rain—and it rains practically every day in the Shanghai winter—dripped through the cracked ceiling. We usually managed to serve afternoon coffee with sandwiches or cookies, because otherwise the staff committee members were too hungry to think.

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most serious crisis which they had faced in their long and difficult years of internal conflict, they learned to handle their own problems with intelligence and realism.

They developed all sorts of projects with the camps to keep themselves busy and to improve their living conditions. Gardens flourished in 1942. The camp coal was washed and made into short and aprons. Laundry and mending services were organized. Benefit performances and entertainments became a matter of competition among the camps. One of the camps even built an outdoor dancing pavilion which was rented out to neighborhood groups, mostly White Russians and Chinese, to raise money for shoes.

And so even under Axis rule, these refugees learned to live in a democratic way, a lesson which we hope will stand them in good stead for their future.

**Internment**

The SHANGHAI COMMITTEE had gained experience in over-all responsibility for the refugee program, the refugees themselves had developed resourcefulness and initiative in handling the day-to-day problems of the camps, when Mr. Siegel and I were interned early in February, 1943. We never quite understood that year of freedom.

It must be borne in mind, however, that Shanghai itself—its government, utilities, transportation, industry, and so on—all were run by Americans and Britons at the time with Japan was declared. To change all this overnight, putting in Japanese executives who were wholly unfamiliar with the situation, almost inevitably would have meant complete disorganization.

During 1942, the Americans and Britons were allowed to remain in their accustomed jobs, at their usual salaries, but under Japanese supervision. Life in Shanghai went on, and the Japanese learned the ropes, so to speak, without lost motion.

Of course the 1942 situation, with hundreds of thousands of nationals (2,000 Americans, 8,000 British, some Dutch and others) at large in the Japanese controlled city, could hardly be expected to go on indefinitely.

We all expected internment, or "segregation," as the Japanese prefer to term it. I think none of us was surprised when it came.

I had about a week's notice, giving us time to buy some furniture, bedding, and food. Mr. Siegel went first, to the all-men's camp. He is still there. About three weeks later I was one in the first group of women summoned for segregation. There were about 1,000 other American and British nationals—men, women, and children—in my "camp" which consisted of two old unused university buildings.

We were as motley a group as the refugees—bankers and bankers, sea captains and business men, journalists, stenographers, missionaries, housewives, dancers, even prostitutes. We included old Shanghai Hands, men who had lived in the Orient for forty-odd years and who had enjoyed their status as "the white man in the East." To the Japanese we were just "enemy nationals" and were housed and fed alike.

I have always held that given a certain set of circumstances, human beings will react alike. Sometimes the overt expressions differ, with differences in background; but the reaction is the same.

In my years among refugees, I have worked with persons from every walk of life. Hitler did not limit his victims to any one social, economic, cultural, or occupational group. Each anti-Nazi I knew as an exile behaved according to his individual reactions to insecurity, hunger, cold, and the pressures of being hunted and rejected.

I have encountered lying and stealing among refugees. I have seen many instances of selfishness and cruelty, lack of discipline, aggressiveness. At the same time I have seen kindness and unselfishness, fine leadership, self-control, generosity, integrity. I was to see the same human variation in my internment.

Overcrowding, lack of tasty and nourishing food, lack of freedom and privacy, uncoventional work and, above everything else, uncertainty, made my confères react to this situation exactly as I have seen refugees behave.

When a well-to-do American, who had always been socially secure, had to stand in line for fifteen minutes to get his little bowl of stew he was frankly greedy, very eager to make sure his neighbor did not get more than he. He was hungry and food was limited. He behaved exactly as had a German refugee of similar background in one of the camps.

When a British school teacher had to put on rubber boots and clean the latrines he was grumpy and ungracious. Certainly this was not in accordance with his tastes or his usual occupation. He was very rude to his roommates that day. Similarly, an Austrian teacher, when it was his turn for latrine duty in the refugee camp.

At the same time there were the many others in our camp, Americans and Britons, who worked early and late to make life a little easier and more comfortable for us all; there were men and women who were able to "take it" with poise and good humor; there were men and women with power drives which upset the whole community.

Leisure means the opportunity for wholesome recreation. This the London planners have recognized. Parks and open spaces are to be provided for all, a minimum of 4 acres per 1,000 persons in the heart of the city. This is more than double what was provided hitherto. There were many authorities who favored 7 acres per 1,000; and for the Green Belt at the outer edge of the metropolis the minimum is put at 7 to 10.

The principles of postwar planning embodied in the London Plan in truth take on a greater significance the closer one gets down to the concrete proposals. Take those for elbow room as vital to health under modern conditions of life and labor. Nine main types of open spaces are listed, ranging from "amenity parks and parkways" to small play centers near where children live. To assure urban dwellers easier and wider access to the land, a new road system would connect the various park units—along with "green strips" between

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